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This article presents a comparative review of systems of collection of pension
contributions in three Central European countries. We discuss some basic require-
ments for successful contribution collection and show how these three countries fare
in that regard. The changing role of the social security institutions is described. The
broad trend toward integrated collection systems, with an enhanced role of the tax
authority is clearly discerned, although with some country-specific features. Contribu-
tion compliance is analysed for the largest group of insured persons – employees,
using the indicator: covered wage bill (as percentage of GDP). The value of this
indicator has mostly been decreasing in the 2000s. This is not a satisfactory develop-
ment and could contribute to the deteriorating financial sustainability of public
pension systems.
Keywords: contribution collection systems; contribution compliance; covered wage
bill; pension rights; Central Europe; pension system
1. Introduction
A number of Central and East European countries reformed their pension systems
during the 1990s and early 2000s. A quite common characteristic of these reforms was
that, in the preparatory phase, insufficient attention was given to the design of certain
infrastructure elements and to administrative and institutional preparations that are vital
for the successful completion of such large social projects. Among these infrastructure
elements, of particular importance is the process of collecting pension contributions.
Although this has never been a high priority project during pension reforms, it has
drawn the attention of international organisations. Thus, the International Social Security
Association (ISSA) organised an international conference on compliance and contribu-
tion collection in Montevideo in 2009. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has
also been quite active, organising conferences and funding joint research projects on
contribution collection issues. Here, particular attention was given to countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. As these countries experienced large political, economic
and social changes in their transitions to functioning market economies, they were also
forced to cope with the consequences that these changes had on their contribution
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collection systems. Further, the modernisation drive undertaken by these countries could
not bypass the modernisation of institutions involved in contributions and tax collection.
Our paper describes developments in the field of pension contribution collection in
three Central European Countries: Croatia, Poland and Slovenia. These three countries
have not only pursued quite different paths with regard to pension reform but they have
also experienced very different developments of their contribution collection systems.
With regard to pension reforms, Poland was a frontrunner, introducing a notional
defined contribution system (NDC) as the public pension pillar and a mandatory second
pillar in 1999.1 Croatia legislated sweeping changes in the first pillar in 1998, and a
mandatory second pillar in 1999. Slovenia passed pension reform legislation in 1999,
introducing parametric changes in the first pillar and a voluntary second pillar.2 To a
varying degree, these pension reforms also resulted in changes in the pension contribu-
tion collection system. The additional significance of our article to the existing research
is that it analyses the complex issue of contribution collection systems, while its
scientific contribution in the field is in comparing three post-socialistic states and their
development in social security.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 will present a discussion of
issues related to contribution collection, in particular, what characteristics are required
for successful contribution collection. Section 3 will provide a brief description of the
main functions involved in the contribution collection process: we start with the proce-
dures for registration of insured persons and procedures for the payment of contribu-
tions, together with the control procedure. Here, we will also describe the flow of
information from the employer to the relevant social insurance institution, to the tax
authority and to the employee. The treatment of self-employed persons is somewhat dif-
ferent and is beyond the scope of this review. Apart from the control function, we will
also look at the audit, enforcement and record-keeping function, all in a comparative
perspective. Section 4 will deal with contribution compliance: the question of arrears
and contribution debt, the analysis of the overall quality of contribution compliance and
– last but not least – what happens to workers’ rights if pension contributions have not
been paid. Section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Some common elements of contribution collection processes
Enoff and McKinnon (2011) identify several key elements relevant for successful contri-
bution collection: (i) the organisational location of the collection function; (ii) the age
(or maturity) of the social insurance programme; (iii) the degree of coverage and size of
the labour force; (iv) the degree of automation; (v) the extent of coordination with out-
side organisations, (vi) the application of a process of constant evaluation and adjust-
ment of collection policies and practices; and (vii) social security ‘culture’ in a country.
With regard to the first element – organisational location of the collection function – it
concerns who is responsible for the collection of pension contributions: the social insur-
ance institution or the tax authority. Here, a fairly common view among experts (Bailey
and Turner 1998, McGillivray 2001) is that combining the collection of social security
contributions and taxes can improve compliance and result in a more efficient use of
resources. A similar position has also been expressed by Ross (2004), who states that
‘[i]n principle, integration of collection activities will work best when both the social
insurance agency and the tax administration are both modernised so that the task of
integration can be narrowly focused on the transfer of collection functions.’ Barrand,
Ross, and Harrison (2004) document the overall discernible trend of moving from a
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parallel collection system (with the social insurance institution responsible for contribu-
tion collection and the tax authority responsible for tax collection) to an integrated
collection system, with the tax authority assuming responsibility for the collection of
contributions and taxes.
In Central and East European countries, the movement to integrated collection sys-
tems did not quite follow Ross’s prescription, as the integration occurred mainly through
the modernisation of the tax administration and not through a synchronised modernisa-
tion of the tax administration and social security administration. Of course, not all coun-
tries in the region moved to integrated collection systems. Thus, in Poland, the social
insurance institution (ZUS) retained the contribution collection function. In Croatia, the
tax administration assumed responsibility for contribution collection starting from July
2001. In Slovenia, contribution collection was traditionally in the purview of the tax
administration or its proxy: the newly formed unified tax administration assumed this
responsibility starting from 1996, whereas the Central Payment Agency was responsible
for contribution collection3 in the pre-transition (socialist) period and up to 1996. With
regard to the second element – the age (or maturity) of the social insurance programme
– all social insurance systems in Central and East European countries date from at least
the early post-war period. However, during the 1990s social insurance systems in these
countries underwent radical changes amid unfavourable economic circumstances. This –
predictably – caused severe problems with contribution collection. As for the third ele-
ment – the degree of coverage and the size of the labour force – it concerns not only
how many workers are covered by social insurance, but also the quality of the coverage.
A large informal economy, with a large proportion of the rural population, large propor-
tion of self-employed and atypical employment are all elements that cause problems in
the social insurance system – even in mature and developed ones. Thus, Sailer (2011)
demonstrates the low coverage of the self-employed in the mandatory pension system of
Germany, with almost three quarters of all self-employed being without mandatory pen-
sion insurance. A very high non-compliance rate among the self-employed in the US is
documented by Manchester (1999). Similarly, the coverage of the self-employed and
farmers in Slovenia, Croatia and Poland is also problematic, as these two groups of
insured persons are characterised by a low quality of coverage. With regard to the fourth
element – the degree of automation – much progress has been made in the use of IT
solutions in the contribution collection process, resulting in improvements in the effi-
ciency of contribution collection. As a matter-of-fact, most papers presented at the
Tokyo conference on Priority challenges in pension administration (Takayama, 2011)
dealt with the use of IT and the assessment on its impact on the organisation of social
insurance institutions and improvement of customer services. In Section 3 we shall
document the important changes with regard to the management of data and the
introduction of IT in the three Central and East European countries.
With regard to the other elements required for a successful contribution collection
system: coordination with outside organisations, constant evaluation and adjustment of
collection policies and practices, the social security ‘culture’ in the country, we note that
successful coordination – particularly between the tax authority and social insurance
institutions – requires harmonisation on a number of definitions (Barrand et al., 2004).
In particular, common definitions of income for tax and social contribution assessment
purposes is highly desirable, as well as common definitions of employees and the self-
employed. Social security ‘culture’ in a given country might well include trust in social
security institutions. In a number of Central and East European countries, the low level
of trust in these institutions had undesirable implications for their social protection
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systems. Most of these ex-socialist countries introduced paradigmatic pension reforms,
with a mandatory, fully-funded second pension pillar. Typically, enrolment in this pillar
was mandatory for young workers, whereas older workers were required to stay in the
‘old’ system. All the other workers could voluntarily join this second pillar, thus chan-
nelling a part of their pension contribution to the second pillar pension funds; by joining
the second pillar they were also forced to relinquish certain pension rights from the first
pension pillar. Many of these workers who could choose whether to stay in the ‘old’
system or whether to join the new (‘mixed’) system, with the fully-funded second pillar,
actually decided to join the new system. Their enrolment by far exceeded expectations.
It has been shown for Hungary (Augusztinovics et al., 2002) that some 20% of the total
membership of second pillar pension funds had no rational financial reasons for joining
the mixed system; a similar percentage of insured persons in Poland stated that they
joined the second pension pillar funds ‘due to troubles with ZUS’ (Chłoń-Domińczak,
2002, p. 161). Needless to say, many of these ‘voluntary’ entrants came to regret their
decision and governments in a number of these Central and East European countries
were forced to offer possibilities for moving back to the ‘old’ system (single public
pension pillar) to these insured persons.
3. The contribution collection process in Croatia, Poland and Slovenia
There are a number of tasks and phases in the contribution collection process. The first is,
obviously, proper registration of employers and employees within the social insurance
institutions. These procedures differ across the three countries, mostly with regard to
whether registration is unified, so that a single registration within a social insurance insti-
tution suffices or separate registration is required for each social insurance institution. It is
the employer’s (contribution payer’s) duty to register with the appropriate social insurance
institution. In Poland it is the Social Security Institution (ZUS) and in Slovenia it is the
Institute for Health Insurance (ZZZS), whereas in Croatia separate registrations for each
social insurance institute are still required. The employer must submit a request for regis-
tration of an employee in a similar fashion. As regards the contribution collection func-
tion, in Poland and Croatia the push for rapid modernisation of the collection system was
imposed by pension reforms, with the introduction of a mandatory second pillar. This
requires that individualised monthly payments and other information for second pillar
contributions have to be processed by the relevant institution (tax administration or social
insurance institution), before they are transferred to the appropriate pension fund.4
Extending the requirement for individualised payment records of contributions to the pub-
lic pension scheme (first pillar) is but a small additional step. Clearly, countries that did
not opt for a mandatory fully funded private pillar (second pillar) – such as Slovenia –
were under less pressure to modernise the collection procedure for the public pension
scheme (Vezjak and Stanovnik, 2004). However, even Slovenia eventually did catch up,
switching from aggregate monthly reporting to individualised monthly reporting in 2008.
Table 1 provides information on the monthly reporting requirements in the three countries,
showing that only Croatia has also retained an aggregate monthly reporting form (the ID
and IDD forms), which the employer sends to the tax authority.5
The procedure for monthly reporting of individualised mandatory second pillar con-
tributions is virtually the same as reporting for the first pillar contributions: in Poland
this information is sent to the social insurance institution (ZUS), whereas in Croatia
aggregate data are sent to the tax administration and individualised data are sent to a
special agency, REGOS, whose task is to monitor and control second pillar
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contributions. In Slovenia, persons working in hazardous occupations are enrolled in a
mandatory pension fund, managed by Kapitalska družba (KAD), which is a state-owned
pension management company; monthly (individualised) reports are sent by employers
to this pension management company. In Poland, the social insurance institution (ZUS)
has the main role in the contribution collection process. ZUS is not only responsible for
the control of data, i.e. checking whether the information on contributions paid corre-
sponds to the money received; it also performs inspections, that is, on-site and in-depth
inspection of a firm’s accounts and whether contributions have been paid according to
the rules and regulations. ZUS has the power to allow deferred payment of contributions
due and is also in charge of enforcement of contribution payment. As stated by
Chłoń-Domińczak (2004, p. 188), ZUS has – in this respect – the same capacity and
authority as the tax administration. However, ZUS cannot by itself write off any part of
old-age pension contributions due (Chłoń-Domińczak (2004, p. 189).
With regard to the ‘power and competencies’ criterion, the Slovene Pension and Dis-
ability Insurance Institute (ZPIZ) is in an intermediate position, having less authority
than ZUS, but more than the Croatian Institute for Pension Insurance (HZMO). The tax
administration performs the control function, checking whether the information received
on the monthly forms corresponds to the monies received on its account within the sin-
gle treasury account. Following this, the tax administration transfers these payments to
the ZPIZ account within the single treasury account. The inspection of employers’
records is performed not only by the tax administration, but also by ZPIZ, which has its
own staff of inspectors. However, the responsibilities of ZPIZ stop here, as ZPIZ has no
power of enforcement; it can only proceed to notify the tax authority of irregularities
uncovered during the inspection. After receiving such a report from ZPIZ, a separate
inspection of the employers’ records is performed by the inspectors of the tax adminis-
tration; if necessary, the tax authority initiates enforcement procedures. The power to
defer payment of contributions, as well as the power to write off debt, is exclusively in
the domain of the tax administration.
Of the three social insurance institutes, the Croatian Institute for Pension Insurance
(HZMO) has the weakest competencies. The control function is performed by the tax
authority, which also performs on-site inspections and has the exclusive right to grant
deferral of contribution payment, as well as the power of enforcement and write-off of
contribution debt. As a matter of fact, HZMO does not even disburse pensions, as con-
tributions are not transferred to the HZMO account, but rather remain in the state trea-
sury account for direct disbursement to pensioners. The pension reform in Croatia also
introduced a new institution (agency) – REGOS. Originally, it was envisaged that this
agency would be responsible for the collecting, enforcing, registering and transferring of
mandatory second pillar contributions, and for the registration of affiliation, switching
and account management (Anušić, O’Keefe, & Madžarević-Šujster, 2003, p. 38).
Table 1. Monthly reporting requirements for the employer to the tax administration (T) or social
insurance institution (S) on public pension contributions paid, 2010.
Croatia Aggregate (T) and individualised (R)
Poland Individualised (S)
Slovenia Individualised (T)
Notes: For Croatia, individualised (R) refers to the individualised form that the employer sends to REGOS, the
agency in charge of recording contributions and contribution bases for the public pension scheme (first pillar)
and mandatory private pension schemes (second pillar).
Source: The authors according to national regulations and National Pension Insurance Institutions.
Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja 1153
However, this tall order has been somewhat downsized during the following years, as
the tax authority was strongly opposed to such an arrangement, taking this as an
infringement on its powers and competencies. The tax authority won the ‘tug-of-war’,
so that the enforcement for first pillar and second pillar contributions has not been trans-
ferred to REGOS. Particularly important changes have occurred in the transfer of data:
this is now done mostly in electronic format, as seen from Table 2, which compares the
reporting modes in the early 2000s and early 2010s.
In Croatia, monthly reporting in electronic format is mandatory for medium and
large companies and starting from 1 January 2012 it will be mandatory for all employ-
ers employing more than 100 workers.6 In Poland, in the early 2000s, the electronic for-
mat was mandatory only for employers employing more than 20 persons, using
predesigned software provided by ZUS. By the late 2000s, the mandatory requirement
was expanded, so that it now includes all firms employing more than five persons.
Slovenia introduced mandatory electronic monthly reporting for all employers starting
in July 2008 and it was fully operational in January 2009.7 Prior to 2008, monthly
reporting was either in paper format or was provided on other media (flash discs, etc.).
The introduction of new IT and relevant computer software was not without problems.
The quite serious difficulties and ‘crisis’ situation at ZUS, due to the delay in the intro-
duction of the IT system, as well as problems experienced in matching identification
numbers of insured persons is well documented.8 This was particularly severe in allocat-
ing contributions to the individual accounts in the second pillar. The height of the crisis
was in 1999, and the situation was completely normalised only by the end of 2002. In
spite of the fact that ZUS received payment of second pillar contributions from
employers, a large proportion of the contributions could not be allocated to the second
pillar pension funds. This unallocated amount was recorded as a debt of ZUS toward
the pension funds. In 2003, a special law was passed in the Sejm to repay this debt with
government bonds. The unallocated contributions to the second pillar pension funds
have been gradually cleared, so that reconciliation is now complete.
As already mentioned, Slovenia introduced the electronic format for reporting of first
pillar contributions in July 2008. The testing phase lasted until the end of the year, so
that from January 2009 monthly reporting of contributions in electronic format is
mandatory. No serious difficulties have been reported – possibly also because the indi-
vidual identification (tax) numbers are well established. What information do the tax
authority and social insurance institution require, on a monthly basis, from the employer
with respect to personal income tax (PIT) and social contributions paid on behalf of
their employees? In Slovenia, the employer must provide the monthly declaration
(REK) containing individual data on social contributions and withheld PIT; this is sent
Table 2. Social contributions: changes in the monthly reporting mode, early 2000s and early
2010s.
Early 2000s Early 2010s
Croatia No electronic format Mandatory electronic format for medium and large
companies
Poland Electronic format (paper format
available for all employers)
Mandatory electronic format (with exception of
employers with fewer than five employees)
Slovenia No electronic format Mandatory electronic format
Source: The authors according to national regulations and National Pension Insurance Institutions.
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to the tax authority. The information provided in the REK declaration also includes the
contribution base and taxable income for PIT. In Poland, the employer must provide
ZUS with a monthly declaration containing data on social contributions paid. This dec-
laration also includes information on the contribution base. In Croatia, the employer
must send two forms: an ID declaration (containing only aggregate data on social con-
tributions paid and PIT withheld) to the tax authority, and the individualised R-Sm dec-
laration to REGOS, which contains only data on contribution bases and pension
contributions for the first and second pillar.
What information do the tax authority and social insurance institution require, on an
annual basis, from the employer with respect to PIT and social contributions paid on
behalf of their employees? In Slovenia, the tax authority ceased requiring an annual
individualised declaration on taxable income, contribution base, social contributions and
PIT withheld, for the tax year 2010.9 However, the employer does send an annual (M-4)
declaration to ZPIZ, containing individualised data on the contribution base (only for
pension and disability insurance), pension contributions paid and pension contributions
due. The data on the M-4 form are not fully compatible with the monthly REK form,
so that the M-4 data cannot be obtained by simply summing up the monthly REK
forms. In Poland, the employer provides the tax authority only with annual data on PIT
withheld, for each employee. There is no additional requirement, as ZUS compiles the
necessary annual data on social contributions paid from the monthly forms it received
from the employer. In Croatia, the employer still sends to the tax authority the annual
declaration IP, containing individualised data on taxable income, the contribution base,
pension contributions and withheld PIT.
The ‘who receives what and when’ question is relevant, as it reveals the roles and
positions of national social insurance institutions. Thus, only ZUS receives the monthly
information necessary for the control of contribution payment. As the Slovene Pension
and Disability Insurance Institute (ZPIZ) does not perform the control function (this is
in the domain of the tax authority), it does not require monthly data; the same applies
to the Croatian Pension Insurance Institution (HZMO). However, there are differences
in the competencies between the Slovene and Croatian social insurance institutions:
ZPIZ has an account within the state treasury, from which pension benefits are being
disbursed, whereas HZMO does not have such an account. In Croatia, pensions are
directly disbursed to pensioners from the Ministry of Finance account within the trea-
sury.10 Another difference is that ZPIZ receives its annual declaration M-4 directly from
the employer, whereas HZMO, the Croatian social insurance pension institution,
receives the annual data from the REGOS agency.11 The allocation of relevant functions
in the pension contribution collection process is depicted in Table 3.
The role of ZUS is exceptional, and it defies the usual allocation of functions,
according to which the only core function of the pension insurance institution is record-
keeping of information on employees, i.e. information that will be relevant for the cal-
culation of pensions upon retirement. That the pension insurance institution should be
responsible for the collection of relevant employee information is quite obvious, as the
natural competency of the tax authority is not the long-term storage of data relevant for
the granting of social insurance benefits. As for Slovenia and Croatia, the relinquishing
of certain functions by the social insurance institutions was relatively recent. Thus, up
to mid-2001, Croatia had separate systems for collection of social insurance contribu-
tions and PIT (Bejaković, 2004, p. 69), with HZMO responsible for the collection of
pension contributions, control and on-site inspection of contribution payments, as well
as deferral and write-off of contribution debt. From 2003 onward, all these functions
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were allocated to the tax administration. In Slovenia, ZPIZ had the authority to grant
deferrals and write-off of contribution debt;12 changes in the Pension and Disability
Insurance Act, enacted in 2005, ceded this function to the tax authority (starting from
2006). Further changes have been introduced and were effective from January 2011,
completely abolishing the right to grant deferrals and payment of contribution debt in
monthly instalments.
For each of the five functions depicted in Table 3, there are detailed procedures and
regulations stipulating how national tax authorities and social insurance institutions shall
properly perform them. Although procedures differ between countries, there are certain
communalities to be observed. The control of contribution payment is mostly concerned
with (a) checking whether the required monthly data are – at all – provided by the
employer and (b) checking their internal consistency Thus, with regard to the control
function, in Croatia the employer’s bank is still required by law to inform the tax
authority on paid wages no later than eight days after wages were paid. As stated by
Bejaković (2004), this requirement is not being enforced. In addition, if the tax authority
does not receive the required ID or IDD monthly form from the employer, it notifies the
employer. If the employer does not respond, the tax authority sends a written request.
The procedure in Slovenia is similar, in that the tax authority relies strongly on the
monthly REK forms; failure on the part of the employer to respond and provide this
form results in a repeated request and eventually to on-site tax inspection. This means
that the tax base is assessed, with the labour inspection notified in order to establish
whether there is a breach of the labour code.
In Poland, all information sent to the social security institution (ZUS) is verified.
This includes: correctness of ID numbers, correctness of individual information, correct-
ness of individual data with contributions transferred. In the case of inconsistencies,
requests for completion or correction of information are issued. In the case of large dis-
crepancies, on-site inspections are performed. Of course, only on-site inspection can
reveal more subtle omissions and underreporting of incomes and contributions paid. The
function of enforcing social contributions is the ‘natural’ purview of the tax authority,
as employers who do not pay social contributions typically also do not withhold per-
sonal income taxes on behalf of the employees. However, we have seen that Poland has
a different arrangement, whereby ZUS is in charge of the enforcement of contribution
collection. The importance of deferrals and write-offs of contribution debt has somewhat
decreased since the early years of transition to market economies. In this early period,
Table 3. Allocation of relevant functions in the pension contribution process in Croatia, Poland
and Slovenia, as of 2011.
Function Croatia Poland Slovenia









ZUS and Tax authority Tax authority




ZUS to the extent limited
by the law
Tax authority
Record-keeping of relevant employee
information
HZMO ZUS ZPIZ
Source: The authors according to national regulations and National Pension Insurance Institutions.
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with big state enterprises forced into restructuring, special laws were enacted in
ex-socialist countries (including Poland, Slovenia and Croatia) granting the deferral of
payment of contributions for these enterprises. At present, the granting of deferrals and
write-offs of contribution debt varies considerably among countries. In Croatia, there are
no specific rules for granting deferrals of contribution payment. However, as stated by
Šnajder (2009), the tax authority has, in recent years, very rarely granted deferrals and
write-offs of pension contribution debt. Unlike Croatia, Poland has detailed procedures
for the granting of deferrals (and instalment settlement) as these can be subject to
regulations on public aid. In any case, deferrals of contribution payment can be granted
only to those employers who do not have any contribution debt so far. Poland still pro-
vides the possibility for a ‘systemic’ write-off, this is applicable to public health-care
institutions that go through a restructuring process, and ZUS can write-off some of the
contribution debt of these institutions. As already mentioned, Slovenia has abolished the
possibility for granting deferrals, and write-offs are in the purview of the tax authority.
4. Contribution compliance and social insurance rights
How well does the tax authority or social insurance institution perform its function of
contribution collection? In other words, what can we say about contribution compliance?
Contribution compliance cannot be viewed in isolation, without taking into account the
overall economic development of a country and the size of its formal sector. There are vari-
ous indicators for measuring the quality of contribution compliance, and we shall not
review them here.13 Probably the simplest indicator to use would be the level of arrears (as
a percentage of all contributions collected). Arrears measure the amount of contributions
due, but not remitted to the tax authority or social insurance institution. It says nothing
about lost contribution revenue due to unreported or underreported wages and other income
subject to contribution payment. A broad indication of unreported and underreported wages
and thus of evaded social contributions could be obtained through information from on-site
inspection, but this information is not readily available. We have therefore opted for the
indicator covered wage bill, expressed as a percentage of GDP. This indicator shows the
hypothetical wage bill of the economy that would have, given the statutory social contribu-
tion rate, produced the actual (observed) contribution revenues collected. Of course, this
indicator is not perfect, as it measures compliance at the macro level and includes only the
largest group of insured persons – employees. The self-employed and farmers and other
labour active insured persons are not included. Nevertheless, a decreasing trend-value of
this indicator does signify a worrisome trend: the quality of contribution compliance could
be deteriorating and/or the level of the shadow economy increasing.
Table 4 presents the values of the covered wage bill (as a percentage of GDP) for
the three countries.14 The data presented suggest a trend-decreasing value of the covered
wage bill for all three countries. In particular, a noticeable decrease was experienced in
Croatia, where the value of the covered wage bill fell from 34.3% of GDP in 2000 to
29.6% of GDP in 2009.
Some further precision on contribution compliance can be obtained by relating the
covered wage bill to the actual wage bill, i.e. showing how large a share of wages (and
other labour income) evades contribution payment. Such a comparison is presented only
for Slovenia, as National accounts statistics do not provide data on gross wages and sal-
aries for Poland and Croatia.
Table 5 seems to imply that in Slovenia more than 20% of wages are not subject to
social contributions. Actually, this does not mean that such a percentage of wages
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evades contribution payments, as some wage-like disbursements are – by law – not sub-
ject to income tax and social contribution payments. This applies specifically to vacation
allowances, which represent some 5% of the total annual wage bill, as well as some
other disbursements, such as travel and meal allowances that are received regularly by
employees. Similarly, some forms of contractual work are also – in effect – not subject
to social contribution payments.
Does non-compliance and non-payment of contributions on behalf of the employee
by the employer have consequences for the insured person – employee? It seems that
the prevailing view (also legally codified) is that the employee should not bear the con-
sequences of non-compliance by the employer,15 i.e. that his pension rights should not
be affected. This is in stark contrast to the self-employed, for whom pension rights
depend exclusively on the payment of pension contributions. However, it has to be
admitted that social insurance institutions were never quite comfortable with this, per-
haps viewing it as an open invitation for contribution evasion. Countries that tried to
harden their position, recognising as insurance periods only those periods for which
contributions were actually paid, were quickly forced to ‘backpedal’. For example, in
Romania the pension law enacted in 2000 introduced a provision whereby only periods
for which contributions were paid should count as insurance periods; this provision was
quickly repealed.16 Therefore, the position taken by most pension social insurance insti-
tutions is that even if contributions are owed (but not necessarily paid) by the employer,
Table 4. The covered wage bill as a percentage of GDP, 2000–2009.
Croatia Poland Slovenia
2000 34.3 27.9 35.5
2001 34.3 28.5 34.5
2002 34.5 27.1 34.0
2003 31.9 25.9 34.1
2004 31.9 25.1 34.0
2005 31.5 25.5 34.1
2006 31.3 25.6 33.6
2007 31.6 25.8 32.2
2008 29.2 26.2 33.1
2009 29.6 26.0 35.0
Sources: GDP data obtained from National accounts statistics, data on contributions were obtained from year-
books of the social insurance institutes.
Table 5. The covered wage bill and actual wage bill as a percentage of GDP, 2000–2009,
Slovenia.
Covered wage bill Actual wage bill Ratio (1:2)
2000 35.5 46.0 0.77
2001 34.5 46.5 0.74
2002 34.0 44.3 0.77
2003 34.1 43.9 0.78
2004 34.0 43.9 0.77
2005 34.1 43.6 0.78
2006 33.6 43.3 0.78
2007 32.2 42.8 0.75
2008 33.1 43.7 0.76
2009 35.0 45.6 0.77
Source: For actual wage bill (Gross wages and salaries), Statistical yearbooks of the Republic of Slovenia.
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this period is still counted as an insurance period. For example, the Slovene Pension
and Disability Insurance Act stipulates in article 191 that only periods for which contri-
butions have been paid are counted as insurance periods. Article 192 (1) states that,
regardless of article 191, if contributions are accounted for, but not paid, this is counted
as an insurance period. Article 192 (2) goes even further and states that the very fact
that the employee is insured (i.e. registered by his employer into the social insurance
registry) suffices for counting this period as an insurance period, and therefore this per-
iod contributes towards one’s pension. It must be noted that such a generous treatment
is valid only for first pillar contributions and does not extend to second pillar contribu-
tions. Croatia offers a less generous treatment. If there is no proof of wages actually
paid and pension contributions paid, this ‘insurance period’ is counted only for purposes
of acquiring sufficient years for pensioning. The pension amount is computed only on
the basis of wages actually disbursed. If there is no proof of wages being paid, the
accrual rate for pensions for that ‘insured’ year is 0% (Bejaković, 2004, p. 100). In
Poland, for employees, owed and not paid contributions are taken into account during
pension calculations (in the NDC part of the pension system). The self-employed do not
get pension rights for unpaid contributions. Pension social insurance institutions are try-
ing to raise the awareness of employees with regard to contribution compliance by their
employers, although it is difficult to see why an employee would be motivated to check
whether contributions (on his behalf ) have been paid, if non-compliance does not have
an effect on his pension rights.
5. Concluding remarks
The paradigmatic pension reforms that have taken place in many Central and Eastern
European countries, i.e. partial privatisation of pension systems through the introduction
of a private, mandatory fully-funded second pillar, has had a visible impact on adminis-
tering institutions. Overall, the role of pension social insurance institutions has been
reduced; of the three countries included in our analysis, this reduction was particularly
pronounced in Croatia and – to a lesser extent – in Slovenia. However, defying the
trend, the social insurance institution in Poland (ZUS) has even enhanced its position.
The introduction of the mandatory fully funded private pension pillar also triggered
important changes in the reporting requirements for the employer. In particular, monthly
recording of individual contributions became mandatory. Although individualisation of
monthly reporting is not an inherent requirement for first pillar contributions, except in
the case where an NDC scheme is introduced as a first pillar public scheme, this ‘indi-
vidualisation’ trend seems to have caught on. Croatia introduced monthly reporting of
individual contributions for the first pillar at the same time as monthly reporting of sec-
ond pillar contributions. Slovenia, who does not have a mandatory second pillar, jumped
on the bandwagon and introduced electronic monthly reporting of individual contribu-
tions in 2008. Overall, the benefits of this development and the increase in data-report-
ing (albeit in electronic form) have yet to be seen. A rush toward modernisation by
electronic monthly reporting of individual contributions in public pension systems does
not necessarily and automatically translate into improved compliance. This task, which
is vital for the long-term financial sustainability of social security systems, requires con-
tinuous improvements on the ‘scoreboard’ of key elements relevant for successful con-
tribution collection. Among the most crucial elements is the careful and detailed
planning and coordination between the social insurance institution and the tax adminis-
tration, and one is reminded of the warning of Stanley Ross (2004) that ‘tax collection
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or contribution collection in modern societies requires a government-wide approach. It
is necessary to have the cooperation of a number of government agencies to be
effective.’
Disclosure statement
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Notes
1. The mandatory second pillar has been considerably downsized in 2011, with the contribution
rate for this pillar decreasing from 7.3% to 2.3%, with the difference going to the first – pub-
lic pension – pillar.
2. The second pillar is mandatory only for certain hazardous occupations. For workers in these
occupations, employers pay additional contributions to a special pension fund within the
second pillar.
3. In 1996, the Central Payment Agency was merged with the Administration for Public
Revenues (RUJP) to form the Tax Administration (DURS).
4. Only in Hungary – albeit for a short time period – were contributions for the second pillar
transferred directly from the employer to the appropriate pension fund. This practice ended
already in 1999, so that second pillar contributions are collected by the tax administration,
which then transfers these contributions to the designated pension funds.
5. This is described in greater detail in Bejaković (2004).
6. Monthly reporting is done using the R-Sm form.
7. Monthly reporting is done using the REK form.
8. See Chłoń-Domińszak (2004, pp. 163–171).
9. The annual form, which the employer sends to the tax authority, was abolished in 2010. This
was a year after individualised reporting was fully introduced. This one year lag is similar to
the situation in Poland, where ZUS required that employers provide annual individualised
data for 1999. As reported by Chłoń-Domińczak (2004), this was ‘due to problems in record-
ing monthly declarations’.
10. HZMO provides the treasury with the necessary information for pension payments to be
made (see Bejaković, 2004, p. 77).
11. REGOS compiles the annual data from the monthly R-Sm forms.
12. This was stipulated in the 1999 Pension and Disability Insurance Act (article 228).
13. Some of these indicators are described in Stanovnik and Fultz (2004, p.45).
14. These figures were computed using the latest GDP figures. Owing to upward revisions of
GDP figures for Croatia and Slovenia, the values of the covered wage bill presented here
are lower than those presented in Stanovnik and Fultz (2004).
15. Máté (2004, p. 148) states that ‘[…] the basic concept is that the employer’s failure to pass
on worker contributions must not disadvantage the employee […] even if the deduction of
the employees’ contribution is, due to lack of evidence, only presumable on the basis of the
existence of the insurance, the period of insurance is still counted’.
16. The provision was repealed in 2002 (see Toma, 2004, p. 233).
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